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Abstract Repression is associated in the literature with
terms such as non-expression, emotional control, rational-
ity, anti-emotionality, defensiveness and restraint. Whether
these terms are synonymous with repression, indicate a
variation, or are essentially different from repression is
uncertain. To clarify this obscured view on repression, this
paper indicates the similarities and differences between
these concepts. Repression is the general term that is used
to describe the tendency to inhibit the experience and the
expression of negative feelings or unpleasant cognitions in
order to prevent one’s positive self-image from being
threatened (‘repressive coping style’). The terms self-
deception versus other-deception, and socially related
versus personally related repression refer to what is con-
sidered to be different aspects of repression. Defensiveness
is a broader concept that includes both anxious defen-
siveness and repression; the essential difference is whether
negative emotions are reported or not. Concepts that are
sometimes associated with repression, but which are con-
ceptually different, are also discussed in this paper: The act
of suppression, ‘repressed memories,’ habitual suppression,
concealment, type C coping pattern, type D personality,
denial, alexithymia and blunting. Consequences for
research: (1) When summarizing ﬁndings reported in the
literature, it is essential to determine which concepts the
ﬁndings represent. This is rarely made explicit, and failure
to do so may lead to drawing the wrong conclusions (2) It
is advisable to use scales based on different aspects of
repression (3) Whether empirical ﬁndings substantiate the
similarities and differences between concepts described in
this paper will need to be shown.
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Introduction
People differ in their tendency to openly show, or to hide
their negative emotions. This is an important topic in
behavioral medicine, since studies have shown that
repression is a potential health risk factor for disorders as
diverse as chronic pain (Beutler et al. 1986) and cancer
(Jensen 1987; Weihs et al. 2000). Another reason why
repression may be considered a relevant topic for research
in this ﬁeld is that the tendency to avoid expressing neg-
ative emotions (also labeled ‘repressive coping style’) is
known to distort the assessment of a patient’s distress. As a
result, this tendency to repress negative emotions may lead
to making false conclusions. For instance, if patients report
levels of distress similar to healthy individuals but show
more repressive tendencies, they may in fact be more
distressed. This repressive tendency may even inﬂuence the
reporting of somatic symptoms and quality of life (Koller
et al. 1999).
The possible inﬂuence of repression on disease devel-
opment, health behavior and symptom reporting has been
investigated in many studies. Summarizing the ﬁndings
proves problematic, however, as authors use different
labels for ‘repression-like’ concepts, such as repression,
suppression, non-expression of negative emotions, emo-
tional control, emotional inhibition, rationality, anti-emo-
tionality, type C response style, defensiveness, restraint,
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blunting. It is unclear whether this array of terms actually
refers to the same concept or altogether different concepts.
For instance, is forgetting details of traumatic events (e.g.,
sexual abuse or war experiences) comparable to not
wanting to show one’s emotions because of one’s prefer-
ence to rationalize? Is the tendency to minimize one’s
problems and to emphasize the positive aspects of experi-
ences comparable to non-expression of negative emotions
because one is afraid of personal confrontation? And yet in
all these instances, the term repression is used.
The meanings of the various terms used in this ﬁeld are
deﬁned below and an attempt is made to analyze their
relationships on a conceptual level. This treatise does not
discuss theories of repression and related constructs, but
concerns the meaning of concepts. In our view, confusion
exists more on the level of concepts than on the level of
theories, and these theories are not very helpful in clari-
fying the conceptual confusion that exists. For instance,
there is no theory that brings to notice that repression and
concealment—whereas the literal meaning of these words
may suggest overlap—refer to fundamentally different
concepts. Nor is there any theory that alerts against the
special use in some Behavioral Medicine texts of the term
‘denial’ in the sense of minimizing the seriousness of a
disease and not as denial of negative emotional states in
general (Brown et al. 2000; Butow et al. 1999, 2000; Greer
et al. 1979). It is important to add here, that several terms in
this ﬁeld have been introduced not on the basis of theory,
but during the process of developing a measurement
method.
We make a distinction between those concepts that in
our view are related to repression, and other concepts that
are sometimes deﬁned as similar to or related to repression,
but are clearly different. Figure 1 illustrates the conceptual
network.
Repression
Repression is the general term that is used to describe the
tendency to inhibit the experience and the expression of
negative feelings or unpleasant cognitions in order to pre-
vent one’s positive self-image from being threatened. A
typical example of a person with repressive tendencies
would be a sociable and cheerful man who rarely com-
plains about any misfortune including disease, and whose
self-image is one of a positive-minded person who is in
control of his life. When he encounters someone who
discusses an emotional problem, he is inclined to quickly
change the subject in an attempt to avoid entering a world
of anxiety, sadness or worry, which would imply that he
has lost control.
Other authors have presented comparable deﬁnitions,
such as ‘‘Individuals who avoid focusing on ego-threaten-
ing material are termed repressors’’ (Ashley and Holtgraves
2003), or ‘‘repression can be deﬁned as the avoidance of
threatening information’’ (Baumeister and Cairns 1992).
The motive of ‘‘preventing one’s positive self-image from
being threatened’’ is added in order to exclude some forms
of non-expression, namely those due to shyness, social
phobia and introversion. Shy or social-phobic people fear
social situations, which inhibits their emotional expression,
whereas repressive people do not fear or avoid social sit-
uations. Another difference is that shyness, social phobia
and introversion refer to non-expression of both negative
and positive feelings, whereas repression refers only to
non-expression of negative feelings.
Fig. 1 A conceptual diagram
indicating which concepts fall
under the headings of repression
and anxious defensiveness,
respectively, and which
concepts are sometimes
associated with, but
theoretically different from
defensiveness (voluntary
suppression, repressed
memories, denial and
alexithymia)
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here as a synonym for repression. This term suggests per-
haps a focus on expressive behavior only, but it actually
refers to the inhibition of both emotional experiences and
behaviors. An explicit restriction is made to negative
emotions, rather than emotions in general. This asymmetry,
implied in the deﬁnition of repression, is mirrored by
empirical ﬁndings. A repressive tendency appears to be
related to downplaying negative aspects rather than to
overstating positive aspects of a person (Myers and Brewin
1996), and to a memory deﬁcit for real life events associ-
ated with negative emotions but not for events associated
with positive emotions (Davis 1987).
There is no reason to label repression as either positive
or negative on a phenomenological level. Repressive peo-
ple will generally not bother other people with their
problems and may even facilitate social situations by their
positive attitude (Furnham et al. 2003). Conversely, this
coping style may impoverish intimate social interactions
and may in the long run have a negative impact on the
person’s own functioning, due to a lack of insight into their
own psychological functioning, a decrease in the variety of
their coping repertoire and overlooking signals that lead to
seeking medical help in time. In the long term repression
may have negative somatic consequences, including an
increased risk of various disorders.
Below is ﬁrst discussed a proposal by Weinberger to
make a distinction between repression and anxious defen-
siveness (Weinberger et al. 1979; Weinberger 1990;
Weinberger and Schwartz 1990). This distinction is useful
for placing repression-like concepts under one of these two
headings.
Defensiveness
Whereas most elements in this discussion can be ap-
proached on a merely conceptual level, the discussion of
the concept of Defensiveness needs to be introduced by
mentioning empirical ﬁndings. Weinberger (1990) makes a
distinction between two types of defensiveness: He deﬁnes
repression as scoring high on defensiveness but low on
anxiety, and anxious defensiveness as scoring high on both
defensiveness and distress self-report scales.
1 In fact,
Weinberger formed six groups, based on a tripartition of
restraint scores and a dipartition of distress scores, but the
remaining four groups are not relevant to this discussion. In
an earlier publication he describes a more familiar division
of defensiveness types based on a dipartition of social
desirability scores and anxiety scores, which is comparable
to his more recent division (Weinberger et al. 1979). The
two groups appeared to be different on a number of per-
sonality variables. Compared to the other groups, the
anxious defensive group scored low with respect to
assertiveness, ability to express themselves in close rela-
tionships, sensitivity to their own needs and feelings, self-
esteem and self-control. They also scored high on avoidant
personality (shyness), dependency (emotional reliance on
others and approval dependence), obsessive worrying, and
(minor) physical illnesses. The repressive group, on the
other hand, was characterized by high scores for intimacy,
self-esteem, self-control (tendency to use self-management
techniques), defensiveness and alexithymia
2, while low on
avoidant personality. These differences in a broad spectrum
of personality traits indicate that the division into the two
defensiveness groups is more than the product of an
arithmetic procedure; it refers to a constellation of essential
individual differences (Weinberger and Schwartz 1990).
Defensiveness, therefore, covers a broader category than
repression. Defensiveness concerns different strategies to
protect oneself against being hurt psychologically. One
strategy is to behave—more or less anxiously—in a so-
cially acceptable way, to be nice in order not to get hurt,
and to avoid social confrontations. Another strategy is to
inhibit thoughts about negative aspects of oneself, and to
consider oneself as the social person one would rather be.
The ﬁrst condition, anxious defensiveness, includes the
awareness of negative emotions, whereas the second con-
dition, repression, denies these emotions.
Weinberger’s division into two forms of defensiveness
is highly useful. If high levels of anxiety or other forms of
distress are implied in the deﬁnition of a repression-like
concept, one should place this concept under the heading of
anxious defensiveness, rather than under the heading
repression. On an empirical level, a low level of distress
reporting in repression would be expected (negative rela-
tionship between repression and distress), and a relatively
high level in anxious defensiveness (positive relation).
(Un)consciousness
Repression is a tendency that a person may be (partly)
aware of, which in psychodynamic theories is referred to as
suppression, or unaware of, referred to as repression in
these theories. However, (un)consciousness is often not
explicitly included in the deﬁnition of repression as a dis-
tinctive characteristic. To give some citations: ‘‘Repression
1 In the publication under discussion, Weinberger used the term ‘re-
straint’ instead of ‘defensiveness’ and labeled this subgroup as ‘high
distress—high restraint’ (Weinberger and Schwartz 1990, p. 409).
2 Weinberger’s et al. ﬁnding of a relationship between alexithymia
and repression has been contradicted by other studies (see the later
paragraph on alexithymia).
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tion’’ (Baumeister and Cairns 1992, p. 853). ‘‘Repressors
are individuals who habitually and efﬁciently control their
emotions’’ (Boden and Dale 2001, p. 122). Some
authors—on the contrary—stress the role of the
unconscious: ‘‘Repressive-defensiveness is characterized
by a non-conscious avoidance of threatening information’’
(King et al. 1992, p. 87). Repressive-defensiveness is
deﬁned here according to Weinberger’s operational deﬁ-
nition of repression (Weinberger et al. 1979; see above).
Quite confusing is that other authors, using a different term
namely repressive coping but referring to the same opera-
tional deﬁnition of Weinberger, claim the opposite:
‘‘Repressive coping is thought to modulate the conscious
experience of negative affect following the appraisal of
threat’’ (Newton and Contrada 1992, p. 160). Most con-
temporary authors describe repression in terms of active
cognitive processes, such as selective inattention and
motivated forgetting rather than in terms of an unconscious
defense mechanisms (Baumeister and Cairns 1992; Newton
and Contrada 1992; Mendolia et al. 1996). The most
explicit view on this comes from Erdelyi (1993, 2001),
who states that empirical ﬁndings do not support any dis-
tinction between conscious and unconscious forms of
emotional inhibition. He also uses an historical argument.
Whereas many authors referred to Freud when discussing
the difference between repression and suppression, this
is—in Erdeleyi’s view—historically unwarranted, given
that Freud used these terms interchangeably. The notion
that repression must be unconscious is not Sigmund
Freud’s, but his daughter’s, Anna Freud (1946).
If any distinction is made between suppression and
repression, the focus is usually placed on processes, i.e. on
time-limited cognitive acts. The distinction between con-
scious and unconscious forms of inhibition does seem
possible and it is perhaps useful when applying it to acts,
but this distinction is more difﬁcult to apply to traits. The
discussion below is about repression as a trait (‘repres-
siveness’). One may on occasion be aware of one’s ten-
dency to inhibit the experience and expression of negative
feelings, but most of the time be vaguely aware, and more
often totally unaware of them.
Empirical ﬁndings indicate that repressors are often
unaware, or at least not fully aware of their emotional
avoidance style. As indicated below, repressors genuinely
perceive themselves as being low in anxiety and are pri-
marily self-deceivers. Another indication for the (mainly)
unconscious character of repression is the repressor’s
decreased ability to recall personal experiences associated
with a negative affect. When memories are recalled by
repressors, thus having become conscious, they are not
processed more slowly than by the non-repressors (Davis
1987).
Self-deception and Other-deception
Expressing negative emotions may be deliberately avoided
as part of the tendency to make a favorable impression on
other people. This tendency is called impression manage-
ment or, originally, other-deception. It is distinguishable
from self-deception, in which case the person actually
believes his or her positive self-reports (Paulhus 1984;
Rogers and Kristjanson 2002).
Impression management is modestly and negatively
related to reports of negative emotions and somatic
symptoms, while a self-deceptive response style reduces
symptom reporting above the effects of deliberate
impression management (Linden et al. 1986). Given that
underreporting negative emotions is the hallmark of
repression, these ﬁndings seem to indicate that self-
deception is closer to repression than impression manage-
ment. Another characteristic of repression is a deﬁciency in
the memory for emotional events (Furnham et al. 2003;
Davis 1987). This deﬁciency appeared to be related to self-
deception, but not to impression management (Ashley and
Holtgraves 2003).
Two studies found that repressors scored high on both
other-deception and self-deception questionnaires
(Derakshan and Eysenck 1999; Furnham et al. 2002). The
study of Derakshan and Eysenck (1999) also showed that
repressors are more self-deceivers than other-deceivers.
This was demonstrated with the so-called ‘bogus pipeline’
method, where participants are connected via electrodes to
a piece of apparatus resembling a lie detector, which could
allegedly detect whether they are telling the truth. Com-
pared to a control condition, people are generally more
willing to report truthfully about their emotional states
when subjected to the bogus line condition, even if this
report is seen as socially undesirable or embarrassing for
that person. Repressors generally did not show any dif-
ference in anxiety scores between both conditions. This
ﬁnding suggests that repressors genuinely perceive them-
selves as being low in anxiety. They are mainly self-
deceivers, though the questionnaire data indicated that they
also showed some tendency to present themselves delib-
erately in a socially desirable light. In another experiment,
Baumeister and Cairns (1992) showed that repressors who
privately received threatening feedback spent the least
amount of time reading it, whereas repressors who received
the same feedback publicly spent considerably more time
reading it. Non-repressors were unaffected by the favor-
ability of the evaluation (threatening or not) or the private
versus public nature of the situation. These ﬁndings suggest
that repressors abandon self-deceptive strategies in favor of
impression management strategies in an attempt to invali-
date the socially undesirable information about their
personality.
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(SD) and other-deception (OD) scales, including the widely
used Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR)
of Paulhus (1984). Studies have shown that the scores to
SD and OD scales can be inﬂuenced by instructions (Stober
et al. 2002; Pauls and Crost 2004), such as a fake good
instruction (e.g. ‘‘Present yourself as much as possible in a
favorable light’’), a fake being competent instruction (e.g.
‘‘Present yourself as much as possible as being competent
and self-conﬁdent’’), or a fake social harmony instruction
(e.g. ‘‘Present yourself as much as possible in an agreeable
and conscientious light’’). The SD and OD scores changed
differently, dependent on the type of instruction. For
instance, SD scores were most sensitive to the competence
instruction and OD scores were most sensitive to the social
harmony instruction (Pauls and Crost 2004). SD and OD
were measured in this study with the widely used Balanced
Inventory of Desirable Responding. The authors of this
study argue that this questionnaire does not so much
measure SD and OD, as is generally believed, but more so
overconﬁdence versus need for social harmony. This may
imply that the question whether repression is predomi-
nantly associated with self-deception or other-deception
cannot be answered with so-called SD and OD scales, but
only with experimental designs such as applied in the
studies of Derakshan and Eysenck (1999) and Baumeister
and Cairns (1992).
What is the precise relationship between these two
concepts and repression? The character of self-deception,
i.e., believing one’s positive self-report, is completely
compatible with the deﬁnition of repression. There is,
however, no complete overlap between repression and
impression management. An extreme form of impression
management would be consciously trying to project a
positive image towards others while being fully aware of
one’s negative feelings and negative cognitions. This
condition of other-deception without self-deception is not
compatible with the description of repression. Because of
this conceivable exception, other-deception is depicted in
Fig. 1 as only partly overlapping with repression.
Different Aspects of Repression
Certain explanations of repression seem to emphasize the
social aspect, whereas other explanations do not describe
the repressive tendency as speciﬁcally socially related. For
instance, Weinberger and Schwarz, who used the term
‘self-restraint’, state that it concerns ‘domains related to
socialization and self-control and refers to repression of
egoistic desires in the interest of long-term goals and
relations with others’. The term ‘self-restraint’ also
encompasses ‘tendencies to inhibit aggressive behavior, to
exercise impulse control, to act responsibly, and to be
considerate of others’ (Weinberger and Schwartz 1990,p .
382). To label such tendencies, the term ‘socially related
repression’ would therefore seem appropriate. These ten-
dencies may be part of the broader tendency to behave in a
socially acceptable way, which should not be conceived as
simply the need to follow external norms, but reﬂect a self-
concept that depends on the approval of other people.
We suggest using the label ‘personally related repres-
sion’ for a second aspect of repression, which is not pri-
marily socially related and may be deﬁned as the general
tendency to inhibit one’s expression of anxiety, depression,
worry and anger, and not to let oneself be inﬂuenced by
these negative feelings. This heading subsumes several
concepts. Watson and Greer (1983) use the term emotional
control and describe it as ‘the extent to which individuals
report controlling their reactions when a particular emotion
is experienced’, especially anger, anxiety and depressed
mood. This description does not speciﬁcally suggest social
determination. Rationality is another example and is
described by Spielberger (1988) as ‘the extent to which an
individual uses reason and logic as a general approach to
coping with the environment’.
Empirical support for our proposed division was found
in a study that applied a secondary factor analysis to
investigate the interrelationships between various sub-
scales of two repression questionnaires and three distress
questionnaires (Giese-Davis and Spiegel 2001). The
scales applied in this study were the three subscales of the
Courtauld Emotional Control Scale (CECS) used to
measure emotional control, the ﬁve subscales of the
Weinberger Attitude Inventory (WAI), used to measure
self restraint, and three distress questionnaires (POMS,
CES-D and IES; four subscales in total). There is no
reference to social situations in the items included in the
CECS (Watson and Greer 1983). An example item is
‘‘When I feel afraid or worried, I smother my feelings’’.
Most of the items of in the WAI subscales (D. A.
Weinberger, unpublished ) refer to social situations, such
as the item ‘‘I think about other people’s feelings before I
do something they might not like’’. One would expect
personally related repression scales (CECS) to load on
one dimension and scales assessing socially related
repression (WAI) on a second dimension (and the distress
scales on a third dimension). The factor analysis yielded a
four-factor solution, including (1) subscales of the CECS
(2) WAI restraint scales (3) WAI defensiveness scales and
(4) the distress scales. We cannot explain why the WAI
repression scales loaded on two different factors. How-
ever, the ﬁnding that the CECS scales clustered in one
factor and the WAI repression scales in two other factors,
could be seen as support for our division into personally
related and socially related repression.
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Concepts that are in our view different from repression are:
the act of emotional suppression, repressed memories,
habitual suppression, concealment, type C coping pattern,
type D personality, denial, alexithymia and blunting. The
ﬁrst concept refers to an ‘act,’ whereas repression is dis-
cussed in this paper as a tendency or coping style. Four of
these concepts—habitual suppression, concealment, type C
coping style and type D personality should, in our view, be
interpreted as types of anxious defensiveness rather than
forms of repression. Our motive for discussing these ‘non-
repression’ concepts is that the literature may suggest that
these concepts are related to repression.
The Act of Voluntary Suppression of Emotionally
Charged Material
In an experimental context people can be asked to refrain
from showing emotional reactions, or to try not to think
about an emotional condition. Suppression of emotional
behavior or thoughts can also occur spontaneously in
everyday life. Given that such acts can be performed
incidentally, both by people high or low in repression, the
act should be distinguished from the habitual response
style. It cannot simply be assumed that the consequences of
the act of emotional suppression are similar to the psy-
chological and somatic concomitants of being an habitual
repressor. For instance, in the long term emotional dis-
closure leads to a decrease in reported psychological and
somatic symptoms (Smyth 1998). On the other hand,
compared to non-repressors, habitual repressors also report
less distress (Ward et al. 1988; Weinberger and Schwartz
1990; Weinberger, unpublished ; Swan et al. 1992; To-
maka et al. 1992; Bleiker et al. 1993). Therefore, the act of
emotional expression as well as the response style of non-
expression are both associated with low reported distress.
There is an area of research that studies the effects of
inhibiting emotional behavior (Gross and Levenson 1993)
and another area of research that is interested in the effect
of thought suppression (Abramowitz et al. 2001). Partici-
pants in such studies are asked to refrain from emotional
behavior, such as facial expressions, or not to think of a
certain image. Gross uses the term ‘emotional suppression’
in the sense of an act and describes it as the conscious
inhibition of behavioral signs of emotion, while being
emotionally aroused (Gross and Levenson 1993).
Repressed Memories
Repressing memories of traumatic events concerns a
complex of cognitions and emotions that is mainly limited
to a certain theme or event, such as sexual abuse in
childhood. This is different from repression, which con-
cerns the tendency not to express negative emotions in
general. Repression of memories is initiated by traumatic
events, whereas repression is a habitual style applied in a
variety of situations. Although repressing memories of
traumatic events could lead to an habitual style of repres-
sion, or magnify an existing tendency to repression that
does not undo the conceptual difference.
Strengthening of existing repressive tendencies in re-
sponse to a traumatic condition was demonstrated in a
study among women who were awaiting the outcome of
diagnostic tests for breast cancer, which may be conceived
as a traumatic event. An increase in the number of
repressors was found after the diagnosis of breast cancer
was made known to the patients, whereas no increase was
found in women who appeared to be free of cancer
(Kreitler et al. 1993).
In a series of studies, McNally presented evidence that
those who believe they were sexually abused as children,
but have no memory for these events (‘‘repressed memo-
ries’’) show a particular style of information processing,
which is different from those who have never forgotten
their childhood sexual abuse or have never been sexually
abused (McNally 2001). Individuals with repressed mem-
ories exhibited symptoms of psychological distress, ele-
vated levels of dissociation and absorption, superior
forgetting abilities for trauma-related material and memory
distortions. Most of these characteristics were also found in
individuals who report having recalled long-forgotten epi-
sodes of childhood sexual abuse (‘‘recovered memories’’).
These characteristics may reﬂect a propensity for repress-
ing traumatic memories, a propensity for forming false
memories of trauma, or a consequence of abuse itself
(assuming it occurred). Anyhow, this personality proﬁle
relates to information processing distortions of trauma-re-
lated material, not to emotionally loaded material in gen-
eral as found in repression. Moreover, the high distress
scores of individuals with repressed memories are incom-
patible with the concept of repression.
Habitual Suppression
In later publications on emotion regulation, Gross shifted
his attention from suppression as an act to the habitual use
of suppression, which was described as a form of response
modulation that involves inhibiting ongoing emotion-
expressive behavior (John and Gross 2004). Inhibition of
emotional experiences is not assumed, as is the case in the
deﬁnition of repression. Gross even presumes that using
suppression in everyday life might actually be associated
with greater negative emotion experience. Acknowledging
these characteristics, habitual suppression must come under
the heading of anxious defensiveness.
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different from, and in some respects, the opposite of
repression. Whereas habitual suppressors experience less
positive and more negative emotions than other people
(John and Gross 2004), repressors do not differ from
other people with respect to the experience of positive
emotions and they experience less negative emotions
than non-repressors (Furnham et al. 2003). Moreover,
habitual suppressors have a lower self-esteem and a less
optimistic outlook (John and Gross 2004), whereas the
opposite was found for repressors (Myers and Reynolds
2000).
Self-concealment
Larson and Chastain (1990) introduced the concept self-
concealment as the trait version of the act of inhibition,
studied by Pennebaker et al. 1990). The authors deﬁne self-
concealment as a ‘‘predisposition to actively conceal from
others personal information that one perceives as distress-
ing or negative,’’ and they say that ‘‘self-concealed per-
sonal information is consciously accessible to the
individual’’ (Larson and Chastain 1990, p. 440).
How is this concept related to repression? There are
three gradual differences with repression: (1) Self-con-
cealment concerns speciﬁc distressing secrets, whereas
repression concerns negative feelings in general, although
it should be said that there is a rather thin line between
these two elements; (2) Self-concealment is explicitly a
tendency towards voluntary and conscious inhibition,
whereas repression is conceptualized as incorporating both
unconscious and conscious coping strategies; (3) Self-
concealment implies the awareness of distressing thought
contents, whereas repression implies the inhibition to be-
come fully aware of such thought contents. Especially this
last aspect implies that self-concealment could be better
placed under the heading anxious defensiveness, rather
than repression.
Empirical ﬁndings support this supposed conceptual
difference. While repression is often negatively related to
distress reporting (Weinberger and Schwartz 1990; Wein-
berger, unpublished ; Swan et al. 1992; Tomaka et al.
1992; Bleiker et al. 1993; Gick et al. 1997; Vetere and
Myers 2002), a positive association has been found
between self-concealment and depression, anxiety and
physical symptoms (Larson and Chastain 1990) and
rumination (King et al. 1992). A negative relationship be-
tween self-concealment and repression (King et al. 1992;
Ritz and Dahme 1996) has also been reported. In fact, (Ritz
and Dahme 1996) found the lowest scores on the Self-
Concealment scale (SCS; Larson and Chastain 1990) for
repressors and the highest SCS scores among the (truly or
defensive) high-anxious persons.
Type C Coping Style
The Type C concept was ﬁrst introduced in 1980 in an
abstract presented by Morris and Greer (1980), who con-
sidered this coping style as characteristic of cancer pa-
tients. The style was described as being emotionally
contained, especially in stressful situations. Temoshok
independently developed a similar concept, which included
several elements (Kneier and Temoshok 1984), and de-
scribed this coping style as ‘abrogating one’s own needs in
favor of those of others, suppressing negative emotions,
and being cooperative, unassertive, appeasing, and
accepting. The Type C individual is considered nice,
friendly and helpful to others, and rarely gets into argu-
ments or ﬁghts... The Type C individual may be seen as
chronically hopeless and helpless, even though this is not
consciously recognized in the sense that the person basi-
cally believes that it is useless to express one’s needs... The
Type C individual does not even try to express needs and
feelings; these are hidden under a mask of normalcy and
self-sufﬁciency’ (Temoshok 1987, pp. 558–560).
One of the repressive types, as distinguished by Wein-
berger and Schwartz (1990), in our view shows a remark-
able resemblance to the Type C coping pattern. The
characteristics mentioned for anxious defensiveness
resemble the above-mentioned characteristics for individ-
uals who use Type C coping. Both descriptions mention
unassertiveness, low sensitivity to one’s own needs and
feelings, abrogating one’s own needs in favor of others,
emotional reliance on others, being cooperative, appeasing
and accepting, and high levels of distress (obsessive wor-
rying/ helplessness and hopelessness). Because of this
similarity and the inclusion of helplessness and hopeless-
ness in the description of this concept, the Type C response
pattern seems closer to anxious defensiveness than
repression.
Type D Personality
The term ‘Type D personality’ was introduced by Denollet
(1997) to describe those people who are distressed, but who
also inhibit the expression of emotions. Denollet developed
this concept, while working in the ﬁeld of cardiovascular
disorders. It consists of a combination of two factors that
seemed predictive for the development of coronary heart
disease and hypertension. The ﬁrst factor was high distress
levels (anger, depression, anxiety and vital exhaustion) and
the second factor was the inhibition of emotional expres-
sion. This second factor was speciﬁed as reﬂecting social
inhibition (and introversion).
It is important to be aware that according to the
description of the Type D person, the negative emotions of
anger, anxiety, and depression are experienced
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123consciously. Whereas repression and distress are often
negatively related, a high level is implicated in the Type D
personality. Type D persons are categorized as scoring high
on distress and high on social inhibition (Denollet 2005).
Therefore, the Type D personality style is explicitly the
anxious defensive type.
Denial
Denial is conceived here as denying or minimizing the
seriousness of a medical condition, not as denial of emo-
tions or painful events as is commonly the case, and not as
an unconscious defense against painful and overwhelming
aspects of external reality, as described in psychoanalytic
theory. The way denial is described in this paper—denial
of diagnosis or denial of impact—is one of the several
deﬁnitions quoted in the literature (Vos and Haes 2007;
Moyer and Levine 1998). Greer et al. described denial in
breast cancer as ‘‘apparent active rejection of any evidence
about their diagnosis which might have been offered,
including the evidence of breast removal, such as ‘‘it
wasn’t serious, they just took off my breast as a precau-
tion’’ (Greer et al. 1979, p. 786). Minimizing the impact of
cancer is a milder and more realistic form of denial, and
was measured in studies by Butow. (Butow et al. 1999,
2000; Brown et al. 2000). Our deﬁnition of denial indicates
a clear conceptual difference between denial and repres-
sion. Repression does not speciﬁcally refer to the emotional
consequences of a disease, but rather to negative emotions
in general. A person might repress these emotions, while
not denying the seriousness of the disease. Denial or
minimizing can either be an act (an event-driven coping
response) or it can reﬂect a habitual style of minimizing the
seriousness of unpleasant events.
It is interesting that cancer studies showed opposite
consequences of the two phenomena. In studies using a
prospective, longitudinal design to investigate the role of
psychological factors on the course of cancer, two studies
found that repression predicted an unfavorable course
(Jensen 1987; Weihs et al. 2000). Obversely, in four other
studies denial or minimizing was found to predict a
favorable course of cancer (Greer et al. 1979; Dean and
Surtees 1989; Greer et al. 1990; Butow et al. 1999, 2000).
Alexithymia
The concept of alexithymia is derived from clinical
observations of a cluster of speciﬁc cognitive characteris-
tics among patients suffering from psychosomatic diseases,
substance use disorders, and post-traumatic stress disorders
(Nemiah et al. 1976; Bagby et al. 1997). It evolved into a
theoretical construct, with the following salient features:
(1) difﬁculty identifying feelings, (2) difﬁculty describing
feelings, and (3) externally oriented thinking (Bagby et al.
1997).
Due to the difﬁculty of identifying feelings, one might
assume that emotions are not expressed either. However,
alexithymic persons should not be considered to be emo-
tionally ﬂat. Nemiah et al. reported a proneness to sudden
outbursts of crying and anger in these persons, though they
were unable to connect these behaviors with thoughts and
fantasies (Nemiah et al. 1976). Corresponding to these
observations, Sifneos reported that it was common for his
patients to mention anxiety or to complain of depression
(Sifneos 1967), although they used a limited vocabulary to
describe their emotions. The emotions of alexithymic
individuals appear to be rather diffuse, poorly differenti-
ated and not well-represented. Taylor et al. concluded that
alexithymia should be regarded not as a defense against
distressing affects or fantasies, but rather as the reﬂection
of an individual difference in the ability to process and
regulate emotions cognitively (Taylor et al. 1997). They
suggested that this construct is different from ‘other emo-
tion-related constructs such as inhibition and the repres-
sive-defensive coping style.’
The difference between alexithymia and repression is
empirically supported. First, several studies have shown
that the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS)—the most
widely used and well-validated questionnaire for assessing
alexithymic traits—appeared to be unrelated or negatively
related with various measures of repression (King et al.
1992; Newton and Contrada 1994; Myers 1995; Linden
et al. 1996; Taylor et al. 1997). Second, the TAS is unre-
lated (Linden et al. 1996), or positively related with self-
reported distress (Taylor et al. 1997; Verissimo et al.
1998), whereas measures of repression are negatively re-
lated with distress.
Based on psychometric comparisons, alexithymia shows
some correspondence to the sensitizing style of high-anx-
ious persons, rather than the avoidant style of repressors.
Repressive individuals often report that they are not upset
despite objective evidence to the contrary, whereas alexi-
thymic individuals acknowledge that they are upset, but
have difﬁculty in specifying the nature of their distress.
Blunting
Miller (1987) distinguishes two types of individual differ-
ences in dealing with threatening stimuli. Monitors are
those people who tend to seek information when coping
with a threat, such as going to the dentist, being taken
hostage or ﬂying (information seekers), and blunters tend
to avoid information when faced with a threat (distractors).
There is some similarity between blunting and repression,
as both repressors and high blunters avoid distressing
information. Repressors avoid mainly personally relevant,
478 J Behav Med (2007) 30:471–481
123emotionally loaded information. High blunters, on the
contrary, avoid material about external conditions that
people generally regard threatening. There is no implica-
tion in the deﬁnition that high blunters avoid expressing
negative emotions because that would threaten their self-
image, which is explicitly included in the description of
repression.
Discussion
The way in which most people use the term ‘repression’ in
an everyday context indicates that they generally under-
stand what it actually refers to. Whether science was right
to introduce the current assortment of subtle differences
thus exposing the gross simplicity of society’s everyday
use of the term, or whether science has ultimately entan-
gled the term in a maze of unclear terminology is debat-
able. It is undebatable, however, that there is a lack of
consensus about what repression is. The impression is that
the many terms used in this ﬁeld—repression, suppression,
non-expression of negative emotions, emotional control,
emotional inhibition, rationality, anti-emotionality, defen-
siveness and restraint—denote something similar to
repression, but there is no certainty whether they can be
considered synonymous, indicate a subtle variation of
repression, or indicate an associated, but essentially dif-
ferent concept. One reason for this confusion is that deﬁ-
nitions are rarely given, and that hardly ever is indicated
how a new term relates to regularly used terms.
Repression has been deﬁned as the tendency to
inhibit—consciously or unconsciously—the experience
and expression of negative emotions or unpleasant cog-
nitions in order to prevent one’s positive self-image from
being threatened. The term is used to describe an act,
such as avoiding a speciﬁc memory, or a tendency or
coping style (‘repressive coping style’). This paper deals
with repression as a tendency or coping style. Terms
whose deﬁnitions appear to agree with the deﬁnition of
repression, which can therefore be considered synonyms
of repression, are: non-expression of negative emotions,
emotional inhibition, emotional control, anti-emotional-
ity, rationality and self-restraint. Although these terms
may all be subsumed under the heading repression, their
deﬁnitions also suggest some differences concerning the
motives for repression.
We tentatively made a difference between socially
related and personally related repression (see Fig. 1). An
example of socially related repression is ‘self-restraint’,
which encompasses ‘tendencies to inhibit aggressive
behavior, to exercise impulse control, to act responsibly,
and to be considerate of others’ (Weinberger and Schwartz
1990, p. 382). An example of personally related repression
is rationality, which is described as ‘‘the extent to which an
individual uses reason and logic as a general approach to
coping with the environment’’ (Spielberger 1988). In the
ﬁrst category, the tendency to inhibit the experience and
expression of negative emotions in order to prevent one’s
positive self-image from being threatened is (more) so-
cially related, which reﬂects a self-concept that depends
(more) on the approval of other people more so than per-
sonally related repression. Future research will show
whether this distinction is useful or not. A study has indeed
provided some empirical evidence for its validity, showing
that restraint scales and emotional control scales loaded on
different dimensions in a secondary factor analysis (Giese-
Davis and Spiegel 2001).
By deﬁnition, repression implies (some degree of) self-
deception, whereas repression may or may not include
other-deception. Self-deception implies honestly believing
one’s positive self-report. The overlap with repression is
evident, given that ‘‘the inhibition of the experience of
negative emotions or unpleasant cognitions in order to
prevent one’s positive self-image from being threatened’’
implies self-deception. Other-deception is described as
deliberately avoiding expression of negative emotions as
part of the tendency to make a favorable impression on
other people. Other-deception without self-deception,
therefore, seems to be incoherent with the deﬁnition of
repression.
Defensiveness is a broader concept than repression.
Defensiveness concerns different strategies to protect
oneself against being psychologically hurt, which include
repression and anxious defensiveness (Weinberger and
Schwartz 1990). This distinction was made on the basis of
operational criteria. Although high levels of defensiveness
characterize both forms, repressors report relatively low
distress levels, whereas anxious defensive persons report
relatively high distress levels. The division into the two
defensiveness groups appears to be more than the product
of an arithmetic procedure; it refers to a constellation of
essential individual differences (Weinberger 1990). One
essential difference concerns the two defensiveness groups’
association with distress.
We have also indicated which concepts, although
sometimes associated with repression, are basically dif-
ferent from repression: voluntary suppression, repressed
memories, habitual suppression, self-concealment, type C
coping pattern, type D personality, denial, alexithymia and
blunting. The ﬁrst concept concerns an ‘act,’ whereas we
have discussed repression as a tendency or coping style.
Four of these concepts were placed under the heading
anxious defensiveness, because their deﬁnitions imply
experiencing high levels of negative emotions: Habitual
suppression, self-concealment, type C coping style and
type D personality.
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following recommendations for future research: (1) In
studies on the character and the consequences of repression
one should ideally include measures of personally related
and socially related repression, and—as a contrast—a
measure of anxious defensiveness. (2) An acute distinction
should be made when summarizing literature ﬁndings be-
tween repression and concepts that are related to, but
essentially different from repression (3) Future research
will need to show whether relationships between ques-
tionnaires substantiate the similarities and differences be-
tween the concepts described in this paper.
Our objective with this treatise on defensiveness-related
concepts is to provide more clarity in this ﬁeld. The next
step in ﬁnding our way in the current maze of repression
points to a review on defensiveness-related questionnaires.
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